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INTRODUCTION

Social media has opened a whole new world of opportunity for
government officials to communicate with citizens and receive feedback in
a timely and cost-effective manner. Gone are the days where local officials
personally connected with constituents only through pounding the
pavement, running county fair booths, and hosting town hall meetings.
When and how they use social media sites for official versus private
purposes has created a technology-led evolution in First Amendment
jurisprudence, but this evolution is one that is providing slow and confusing
legal guidance to elected leaders. At the same time, online applications and
new social media platforms are being launched at breakneck speeds. This
Article will describe the public forum and government speech doctrines,
provide an analysis of internet-based communications using these First
Amendment principles, and discuss blocking and comment deletions in the
context of recent court decisions involving government officials on social
media.
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FORUM DESIGNATIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment and the public forum doctrine have been
inextricably linked since the early decades of the twentieth century. Prior to
the United States Supreme Court’s 1925 recognition of the freedom of
speech as a personal right, the government could abridge an individual’s
right to speak on government property in the same manner as that of a
private owner. 1 However, while an individual’s First Amendment freedoms
cannot be abridged or reduced, they are not absolute where government
property is concerned. Just as we cannot bust our lungs singing opera in a
public library, we must also recognize a societal need to balance the
competing uses of government property with the individual’s right to free
speech. This is the purpose of the forum analysis, where courts categorize
government property as a type of forum. 2 When a court is deciding if a
government regulation burdening speech is constitutional, the court will first
categorize the location to which a speaker seeks access for the purpose of
expressive activity as a type of forum, and then analyze the government’s
restriction on speech against the constitutional standard that governs in that
forum.

A.

The Three Categories of Forums

There are three categories of forums—the first is the traditional
public forum: the streets and parks. 3 The government has the least control
over an individual’s expressive conduct in this traditional public forum. 4 The
contours of the public forum emerged in the 1970s when the United States
Supreme Court used “public forum” as a legal term and stated that any
restrictions must be “carefully scrutinized.” 5 By contrast, during this period,
the Court defined a non-public forum, places like military bases, in Greer
v. Spock. 6 In a non-public forum, the government has the most authority to
control an individual’s expressive conduct. 7 The third category is limited
ǂ Patricia

Y. Beety, General Counsel, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota; BA
and JD, University of Minnesota. Joline Zepcevski, JD, Mitchell Hamline School of Law,
2020; PhD, University of Minnesota, 2012.
Ronnie J. Fischer, Comment, “What’s in a Name?”: An Attempt to Resolve the “Analytic
Ambiguity” of the Designated and Limited Public Fora, 107 DICK. L. REV. 639, 646 (2003)
(quoting Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897)).
Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2140–41 (2009).
Id. at 2145 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
See id. at 2145.
Id. at 2144 (quoting Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98–99 (1972)).
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 829 (1976) (upholding military regulations banning political
speech on military bases).
Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, supra note 2, at 2145.
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and designated public forums, which arose as a middle ground and are
created by purposeful government action. 8 The designated or limited public
forum is an attempt to determine what happens when the government allows
some people the freedom of expression on its property, but selectively
denies access to others. 9

B.

Forum-based Regulations

The category of forum then defines how government regulation of
expressive activity will be reviewed by the court. A traditional public forum
will be subject to strict scrutiny. 10 This usually means the regulation must be
content neutral and only address the time, place, and manner of the
expressive speech, leaving open ample alternative avenues for expression. 11
If the regulation is not content neutral, rather based on the content of the
speech, the government will need to prove that the regulation is narrowly
tailored to accomplish a compelling government interest. 12 If a court finds
that the forum is a non-public forum, the court will look to whether the
regulation is a reasonable limitation of expressive activity that does not
discriminate based on viewpoint. 13 Finally, if a court finds that the forum is
limited or designated, the court will determine whether the limits are
reasonable based on the purpose of the forum and whether the restriction
is viewpoint neutral—restrictions based on viewpoint are always subject to
strict scrutiny. 14

C.

The Public Forum Doctrine in Digital Spaces

Historically, the United States Supreme Court’s public forum cases
focused on either physical places or resources that were under the
government’s exclusive control and were rooted in the idea that a public
forum is one traditionally open to expressive activity. 15
See generally William Howard, Annotation, Constitutionality of Restricting Public Speech
in Street, Sidewalk, Park, or Other Public Forum—Characteristics of Forum, 70 A.L.R.6TH

8

513 (2011) (reviewing cases regarding the constitutionality of public speech restrictions based
on the characteristics of the forum involved).
Seth D. Rogers, Case Note, Constitutional Law - A Forum by Any Other Name . . . Would
Be Just As Confusing: The Tenth Circuit Dismisses Intent from the Public Forum. First
Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002), 4 WYO. L. REV.
753, 765 (2004).
Howard, supra note 8, at 3.
9

10
11
12
13
14

Id.
Id.
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009) (citing Good News

Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001)).
See Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1994 n.129 (2011).

15
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As recently as 2010, commenters argued that the public forum
doctrine could not apply to the internet because public forums are places
that have “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” 16 Because of the
recent nature of internet communications, this would place the internet
outside of the definition of a traditional public forum.
Instead, courts have applied the definition from Cornelius v.
NAACP—that a public forum exists when a principal purpose of the fora is
the free exchange of ideas. 17 This is the underpinning of the internet, from
a time even prior to the creation of what we now describe as the internet, as
reflected in J.C.R. Licklider and Robert Taylor’s The Computer as a
Communication Device. 18
Current jurisprudence further makes it clear that the court defines
a public forum as more amorphous than a geographical location and not
dependent on ownership. In Rosenberger v. Rector, the United States
Supreme Court stated that a forum could be more metaphysical than
geographic, and the same principles will apply. 19 In Reno v. ACLU, plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act. 20 In
this case, the Court stated that because the internet has vast democratic
forums and is distinguished from broadcast television, there is “no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny” applied to the internet. 21
The Court, comparing users to town criers or pamphleteers, foreshadowed
the later circuit decisions that currently define social media as a public
forum.
Moreover, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, the Court
held that public or private ownership of property was not dispositive of
whether the property was a public forum. 22 This was further supported in
Cornelius v. NAACP, 23 and later reiterated in Denver Area
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 24 where the Court found that
public access channels were a traditional public forum because the privately-

David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: First Amendment Limitations
on Moderating Public Discourse on Government Websites, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1981, 1998

16

(2010) (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
J.C.R. Licklider & Robert W. Taylor, The Computer as a Communication Device, SCI. &
TECH. 21, 21–22 (Apr. 1968).
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861 (1997).
Id. at 870.
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555–56 (1975).
473 U.S. 788 (1985).
518 U.S. 727 (1996).
17
18
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owned stations were controlled by the government and opened by the
government for use by the public. 25
This line of analysis is important in a discussion of government
officials’ use of social media because it must be first asserted that the forum
analysis is appropriately applied to social media. As social media platforms
are privately owned, not a geographic location, and not rooted in tradition,
on its face, the application of the public forum doctrine appears
inapplicable. Recent cases have addressed the threshold question of
whether forum analysis applies in this context, and trending precedent
indicates that the First Amendment does indeed apply to government
controlled digital spaces and a forum analysis is appropriate.

D. The Government Speech Exception
There is “no constitutional right as members of the public to a
government audience for their policy views.” 26 Government property used
by the government for its own speech is not subject to these public fora
limitations because the First Amendment does not apply to the
government’s own speech—the government is not attempting to control the
speech of its citizens when it speaks. The government, when acting as the
speaker, may express viewpoints. 27
Prior to the widespread introduction of social media, it would have
been fair to characterize government use of the internet, as opposed to
regulation of the internet, as government speech. Public-facing websites,
controlled by governmental bodies or officials, that provide information to
the public about governmental functions, rules, or policies with little to no
interactive capability were the norm throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. 28
This shifted dramatically as we moved into the 2008 election season. 29 A
2009 Pew survey showed that twenty-five percent of internet users engaged
interactively with the government over the internet. 30 Today, the number of
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801; Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 774
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For further discussion of ownership and the public forum
doctrine, see Dawn Carla Nunziato, From Town Square to Twittersphere: The Public
Forum Doctrine Goes Digital, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 62–64 (2019).
Minn. State Bd. For Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 286 (1984).
Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 368–70 (2009).
See Ardia, supra note 16, at 1986.
See id. at 1986–88; Aaron Smith, The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008, PEW RESEARCH
CTR.
INTERNET
&
TECH.
(Apr.
15,
2009),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2009/04/15/the-internets-role-in-campaign-2008/
[https://perma.cc/EW2N-YLH5].
Aaron Smith, Government Online, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 1, 2 (Apr.
27,
2010),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2010/04/27/government-online-2/
[https://perma.cc/GQ9A-QU5K].
25

26
27
28
29

30
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government-controlled websites, social media accounts, and other online
interactive forums is innumerable. 31
While the scale of communication has changed, what is more
important is that this is a revolution in how Americans are able to engage
with their government. The internet provides direct engagement. It has
broken down physical barriers to entering the public discourse, removing
the middleman of mass media. However, this does not mean that there is
no longer a middleman. Instead, the intermediary is now the content
providers—whether that be the government itself, through apps and websites
on government-controlled servers, or private networks like Facebook and
Twitter. The internet is not a public medium. 32
When addressing social media specifically, the intimacy of this
private medium allows both individuals and government agents to behave
as though the conversations they are having are not mediated by the same
set of norms and regulations as they would be in a city council meeting or
an in-person town hall. This illusion of private conversation allows
government agents, like a local city council member, to act as they would
privately: blocking an acquaintance they disagree with or deleting a
comment they find distasteful. In their personal use of these mediums, these
acts are almost reflexive because of the nature of the medium itself.
These private networks encourage blocking, deleting, and reporting
posts that violate their terms of service. As intermediaries, the private
networks may act sua sponte, banning or limiting accounts for violating the
terms of service as interpreted by an automated algorithmic function. 33 Even
assessing whether the comment or post was deleted or hidden by a
government agent or the private network is not necessarily straightforward.
The individual usually is not informed who deleted or hid the content, so
they must request the information from the private network. 34
Yet, when acting as a representative of the government, these acts
of deletion and blocking can impact and potentially burden the exercise of
the speech and expression of their constituents. Because of the shift in both
the scale and manner of communication between government agents and
This is not tracked, but for context, in 2017, the Information Technology and Innovation
Foundation found that the federal government had more than 6,000 websites on government
servers, not including social media accounts or forums hosted on other platforms. See Alan
McQuinn & Daniel Castro, Benchmarking U.S. Government Websites, ITIF (Mar. 8,
2017),
https://itif.org/publications/2017/03/08/benchmarking-us-government-websites
[https://perma.cc/H22M-E2PC].
For a broader, but somewhat dated discussion of this, see Ardia, supra note 16, at 1989.
See id. at 1991.
For a conversation about how the private nature of social media companies shapes the
public discourse, see Daphne Keller, Facebook Restricts Speech by Popular Demand,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/facebookrestricts-free-speech-popular-demand/598462/ [https://perma.cc/ESR7-U4FF].
31

32
33
34
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citizens, the question of how that communication can and should be
regulated is now coming before the courts.
III.

A.

WHAT TYPE OF FORUM WAS THE INTERNET
AND WHAT HAS IT BECOME?

First Evolution: The Appropriate Doctrine—Government Speech or
the Forum Analysis?

Prior to 2010, there was virtually no standard for defining how the
government could regulate speech on the internet. 35 Early cases revolved
around government websites, with limited interactivity—pages that contained
“local links,” online forums for job seekers to exchange information, or
informational pages that presented the point of view of a local government
sub-unit. The discussion trended towards asking whether these websites
presented government speech or if the government had created a nonpublic forum.
In Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, the city operated a website
that included a “local links” page that promoted local businesses. 36 An
independent newspaper, The Putnam Pit, known for its critical view of the
local government, requested that its website be added to the local links
page. 37 Cookeville created a policy limiting links to non-profit entities and
organizations that “would promote the economic welfare, tourism, and
industry of the city.” 38 The paper sued, calling the page a designated public
forum and arguing that this policy was impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. 39 The Sixth Circuit held that the website was a non-public
forum. 40
Similarly, in Cahill v. Texas Workforce Commission, the plaintiff
sought to post comments and other information about employers on the
Texas Workforce Commission’s website. 41 Cahill was excluded because the
website limited access to people seeking workers or jobs; he argued that this
was viewpoint discrimination. 42 The court held that the website was a nonpublic forum, and therefore, the state had properly limited access to
See generally Alissa Ardito, Social Media, Administrative Agencies, and the First
Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301 (2013) (presenting an analysis of the conflict between

35

the free speech rights of the government and of its citizens created by the social media
forum); Ardia, supra note 16, at 2019.
Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 76 F. App’x 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2003).

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id.
Id. at 610–11.
See id. at 611–12.
Id. at 612.

Cahill v. Texas Workforce Comm’n, 198 F. Supp. 2d 832, 833 (E.D. Tex. 2002).

Id.
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speakers who were members of the class of speakers for whose benefit the
website was created. 43
However, in Page v. Lexington County School District One, a
school district opposing a tax credit bill for private and parochial tuition and
homeschooling expenses expressed their discontent on the school’s website
and included links to emails and letters written by private citizens who also
opposed the bill. 44 The plaintiff argued this created a public forum because
of the links to documents by private citizens. 45 The court found the website
was government speech, regardless of the links to other documents, but
stated in dicta that had the website been interactive, where individuals could
express opinions or post information, the issue would be different. 46 A small
consensus seemed to have formed that interactive websites were likely nonpublic forums, where viewpoint discrimination would still be
unconstitutional, while static websites were likely to be government speech.
However, this consensus was indeed small and did not predict the wave of
“blocking” litigation that was soon to arise.

B.

“Blocking” Litigation: How Unfriending Someone Really is a “Federal
Case”

The 2016 election cycle was clear in at least one respect: no level of
government or candidate could afford to ignore the power of social media. 47
During this contentious election season, incumbent candidates, as seated
governmental officials, found out that they could not block their opponents
on social media. 48 This allowed political opponents to comment, troll, 49 and
self-promote as much as they pleased on opposing candidate’s pages. As
nerves frayed, cases arose that forced district courts to balance individual
rights to freedom of speech with government officials’ rights to present a
coherent message on social media platforms.
Before these cases made their way through federal district and
appellate court systems, the United States Supreme Court heard and ruled
on Packingham v. North Carolina. 50 The Packingham case centered not on
43
44
45
46

Id. at 836.

Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2008).

Id. at 279–280.
See id. at 284.

Marissa Lang, 2016 Presidential Election Circus: Is Social Media the Cause?, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.govtech.com/social/2016-PresidentialElection-Circus-Is-Social-Media-the-Cause.html [https://perma.cc/4736-32N4].
See infra text accompanying notes 58–61.
“Troll: to antagonize (others) online by deliberately posting inflammatory, irrelevant, or
offensive comments or other disruptive content.” Troll, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/troll [https://perma.cc/GV4Q-4G4C].
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737–38 (2017).
47

48
49

50
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electioneering, but on a North Carolina law preventing registered sex
offenders from accessing any commercial social networking sites where
minor children may become members. 51 The Court held that the law was
not narrowly tailored to the significant government interest in protecting
children from abuse. 52 In dicta for this case, the Justices stated that social
networking sites are the equivalent of the modern public square. 53
Numerous circuits then began using this language in the blocking cases to
apply a public forum analysis to the use of social media by government
officials.

1.

The First Wave of Blocking Litigation: 2018

The first of the blocking cases heard in district court was Morgan v.
Bevin. In this case, two constituents alleged violations of their First
54

Amendment rights due to being blocked from commenting on the
Kentucky Governor’s Twitter and Facebook pages, which the plaintiffs
argued were traditional public fora. 55 The Governor disagreed, stating that
neither social media account was meant to be an “open forum for general
discussion of all issues by the public,” but he did label them as limited public
fora. 56 Using a Minnesota case challenging the application of the Public
Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), the district court in Bevin
disagreed with the parties’ application of the public forum doctrine and held
that the Governor’s social media pages were not subject to a forum analysis. 57
The court found the Governor was engaging in government speech,
which allowed for the government to advance its own speech without
viewpoint neutrality. 58 In particular, the court held the Governor’s Twitter
and Facebook accounts were a means for communicating his own speech,
not for the speech of his constituents. 59 In this way, the accounts were unlike
a traditional public forum meant for group discussion. The court was moved
by the Governor’s argument that the consequence of allowing anyone to
access and post on these social media accounts could shut down the pages
altogether. 60 This is because without culling comments on a government
official’s social media accounts, the court reasoned the communication
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 1731.
Id. at 1737.
Id.

Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018).

See id. at 1006.
Id. at 1006, 1010–11.
Id. at 1010–11 (referencing Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S.

271 (1984)).
Id. at 1011.
58
59
60

Id.
Id. at 1012.
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could be so overtaken with unrelated expressive activity that the accounts
would be useless and abandoned, much like a public park if every statue or
monument must be accepted as protected, expressive activity. 61
At the same time, the Southern District of New York had two cases
on similar facts. The first case the Southern District of New York ruled on
was Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump,
later affirmed by the Second Circuit. 62 Briefly put, the case revolved around
whether it was constitutional for President Trump to block Twitter users
from his account. 63 At the district level, the court in Knight set out that if an
account is owned or controlled by the government, and contains an
interactive space, that portion of the account is a designated public forum. 64
As such, blocking users from that space is impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. 65
This was quickly followed by Price v. City of New York. 66 In Price,
the plaintiff believed police officers and the district attorney’s office
mishandled a series of domestic assault complaints. 67 The plaintiff
addressed her complaints in-person, and later, using social media. 68 The
plaintiff was then blocked from the NYPD’s 28th Precinct Twitter account
(@NYPD28Pct); an account managed by the New York City Mayor’s Office
dedicated to combating domestic violence (@NYCagainstabuse); and an
account named @RPLNYC, allegedly moderated by Commissioner PierreLouis. 69 Plaintiff sued the City, ten city employees—including all three
moderators—and two MTA employees. 70 The City did not dispute that
Brooks and Obe (moderators of @NYCagainstabuse and @NYPD28Pct,
respectively) acted under the color of law, arguing that the curation of the
account was in the service of government speech. 71
Here, the court pushed back against this government speech
argument, stating that reasonable observers would understand that the
plaintiff’s reply tweets criticizing the government were not the City’s own
speech. 72 The court reiterated the First Amendment analysis undertaken by
61

Id.

Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.
N.Y. 2018) [hereinafter this case and the Second Circuit case will be collectively referred to
as Knight v. Trump or Knight].
Id. at 549.
Id. at 574.
See id. at 577.
Price v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF), 2018 WL 3117507 (S.D. N.Y. June
25, 2018).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1, *4.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *14.
62

63
64
65
66

67
68
69
70
71
72
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the district court in the Knight case, setting out that the account must be
owned or controlled by the government, limiting the forum analysis to the
interactive space, and concluding that it was a public forum. 73 However,
unlike in Knight, the Price court did not extend the notion of a traditional
public forum to encapsulate the City’s Twitter account, nor exclude the
Twitter accounts by defining them as non-public forums. 74 The court held it
did not need to resolve the issue because the evidence so strongly suggested
that the plaintiff was blocked to prevent public criticism, which is
impermissible viewpoint discrimination in any forum subject to the Free
Speech Clause. 75
Meanwhile, in the First Circuit, constituents filed a complaint
alleging that Maine Governor Paul LePage restricted access to, and deleted
comments from, a social media page that the Governor managed, violating
their right to free speech. 76 In Leuthy v. LePage, the Governor filed an
interlocutory appeal after the lower court declined to dismiss, arguing that a
government official is acting as a speaker, not as the regulator of a public
forum, when they exercise editorial discretion over the content on a social
media page. 77 When the State is the speaker, it may make content-based
choices. 78 The court held that the matter was not appropriate for
interlocutory appeal because the parties disagreed on a central fact: is the
webpage the Governor’s official webpage or a third-party webpage over
which the Governor posts comments and exercises some control. 79 This
factual decision would impact what standard would apply. 80 The case settled
without reaching the underlying question: was this a public forum analysis
or government speech?
At the end of the 2018 spate of litigation, there was no clear
consensus. The Sixth and First Circuits still entertained the idea that the use
of social media accounts were government speech and, therefore, able to
discriminate against viewpoint. However, the Second Circuit set a stronger
precedent for finding that the interactive portions of social media accounts
should be subject to a public forum analysis, even if there was no holding
on what type of forum category should be applied.

73
74
75

Id. at *10.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *16.

Leuthy v. LePage, No. 1:17-CV-00296-JAW, 2018 WL 4955194, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 12,
2018).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *11–12.
Id. at *5.

76

77
78
79
80
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2019: An Early Consensus

As a wave of these cases began to hit the courts in 2019, the Fourth
Circuit released a strong opinion, Davison v. Randall, 81 reinforcing the
Southern District of New York’s opinion in Knight v. Trump. 82
The plaintiff brought a section 1983 action against Randall, the
Chair of the Loudoun County Board, for violating his freedom of speech
by banning him from Randall’s Facebook page. 83 One element of this case
that is important for municipal law is that, at the district level, Randall was
denied qualified immunity. 84 Randall argued that she was entitled to
qualified immunity because the law surrounding social media and First
Amendment rights is unsettled. 85 The court recognized the Supreme Court’s
rejection of the proposition that online speech is subjected to a different
standard than other protected speech and, therefore, found that Randall was
not entitled to qualified immunity. 86 The court held that if the underlying
allegations were true, Randall substantially violated a clearly established
constitutional right of which a reasonable government official would have
known. 87
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit did not address qualified immunity.
Instead, the court focused on whether the plaintiff had established an injury
in fact sufficient to justify prospective declaratory relief and that Randall’s
“purportedly private actions bear a ‘sufficiently close nexus’ with the state to
satisfy . . . [the] color of law requirement.” 88 In so holding, the factors the
court examined included whether: (1) the conduct is such that the actor
could not have behaved in the challenged way but for the authority of the
actor’s office; (2) it occurs in the course of performing an actual or apparent
duty of the actor’s office; (3) the official used the power and prestige of the
office to damage the plaintiff; and (4) the challenged action by a
governmental official is fairly attributable to the state when the sole intention
of taking the action was to suppress speech critical of the actor’s conduct of
official duties or fitness for public office. 89 The Fourth Circuit found that
912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019).
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D. N.Y. 2018).
Davison, 912 F.3d at 676. Note: Plaintiff had also brought an earlier claim against the
Loudon County Board for violating Plaintiff’s freedom of speech, first for actions taken by
the board on the Boards official page, which was found in dicta to be a limited public forum
and as a respondeat superior claim for the actions of Randall. The court granted summary
judgment for the board dismissing the suit.
Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 227 F. Supp. 3d 605, 613–614 (E.D. Va.
2017).
81
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Randall clothed the Facebook page in the “power and prestige” of her
office, used the page to perform actual or apparent duties, that the specific
action (banning plaintiff) was linked to events arising out of her official
status, and that the ban was an effort to suppress critical speech. 90
In analyzing whether the Facebook page was a public forum, the
court focused on the distinction between the interactive portion of a social
media account and that of the official’s posts or tweets, ultimately rejecting
Randall’s argument that the account was government speech and therefore
not susceptible to forum analysis. 91 The court did not address what type of
forum the account should be categorized as, but held that the ban, under
any designation, was viewpoint discrimination. 92 The court also rejected the
claim of municipal liability by holding that the plaintiff could not establish
that Randall was the final municipal policymaker with regard to the ban, and
instead the record established that the Board retained authority and had an
established social media policy. 93
Simultaneously, in One Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, a nonprofit,
One Wisconsin Now, alleged that three representatives of the Wisconsin
State Assembly violated the First Amendment when they blocked a
constituent from their respective Twitter accounts. 94 In cross motions for
summary judgment, the court held that the officials acted under color of law
in creating and maintaining their respective Twitter accounts in their
capacity as members of the Wisconsin State Assembly; the interactive
portion of these Twitter accounts are designated public forums using the
Knight, Randall, and Packingham analysis (supra); and content-based
discrimination occurred when plaintiff’s Twitter account was blocked. 95 The
court followed precedent and accepted that the interactive portion of a
Twitter account results in a designated public forum and, as such, the
government cannot exclude speech based on content unless the exclusion
can satisfy strict scrutiny. 96 The court found the restrictions could not survive
this high level of scrutiny and thus were impermissible and a violation of the
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 97
Later that same year, California broke with this analysis in
McKercher v. Morrison, determining this was not settled law and that the
official was entitled to qualified immunity. 98 In McKercher, the plaintiff was
90
91
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93
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Id. at 684–86.
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One Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 941 (W.D. Wis. 2019).

Id. at 949, 951–57.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 956.

McKercher v. Morrison, No. 18CV1054 JM(BLM), 2019 WL 1098935 at *4–5 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 8, 2019).
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blocked from what the court described as a city official’s “personal” social
media account. 99 Although, the plaintiff argued this was an official account. 100
After the case’s filing, the city official created additional social media
accounts and clearly identified them as official accounts. 101 The district court
conducted no analysis of what would define a public versus official account.
The court found the matter moot and that there was no standing because
the official changed the original offensive behavior by unblocking all
constituents and creating official accounts. 102 The court noted the current
contradictory district court cases and engaged in a discussion of qualified
immunity. 103 The court held that the issue of a public official’s private use of
social media platforms, like Facebook, to communicate with constituents,
among others, is not well-settled, to say nothing of “clearly established.” 104
Therefore, the official was entitled to qualified immunity. 105
At the same time as the California case was decided in 2019,
Robinson v. Hunt County was heard in the Fifth Circuit. 106 Plaintiff, a social
media user, brought a section 1983 action against Hunt County, the county
sheriff, and Hunt County employees, alleging that the office’s censorship of
its social media page violated the First Amendment. 107 The district court
granted Hunt County’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 108 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the plaintiff had stated a claim for
municipal liability, stating the “plaintiff must allege ‘(1) an official policy (or
custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or
constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving
force” is that policy (or custom).’” 109
The court held that deleting plaintiff’s Facebook comments and
banning her from the page was impermissible viewpoint discrimination
because comments that are inappropriate are still protected speech. 110 The
court assumed the Facebook page was a public forum. 111 Because viewpoint
discrimination is impermissible in any public forum, no further analysis was
deemed necessary to find a constitutional violation. 112 Hunt County argued
99
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Robinson v. Hunt Cnty., 921 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019).

Id. at 444–45.
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that it had not delegated social media authority to the sheriff, but the court
rejected this argument, holding that the sheriff’s authority derived from his
elected position, not by virtue of delegation. 113 Therefore, the sheriff was
found to be the final policymaker. 114 The court also held that the plaintiff
sufficiently pleaded an official policy of viewpoint discrimination because
the written policy (an informal post published on the social media account)
allowed for the deletion of inappropriate comments, and as a result, there
was support for the claim that Hunt County had an explicit policy of
viewpoint discrimination. 115
One month after the Fifth Circuit ruling, Virginia ruled on another
blocking case, again applying a public forum analysis. In Windom v.
Harshbarger, the plaintiff claimed that West Virginia House of Delegates
Representative Harshbarger violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights
when Harshbarger deleted the plaintiff’s comments and blocked the
plaintiff from accessing Harshbarger’s Facebook page, which was used for
official governmental communication. 116 The plaintiff commented on the
page to express opposition for a bill that Harshbarger
supported. 117Accordingly, the plaintiff alleged that “Harshbarger imposed a
viewpoint-based restriction of speech” in a “limited public forum,” with no
opportunity to appeal, further violating plaintiff’s rights under the Due
Process Clause. 118
The court reasoned that private property, such as a Facebook page,
can constitute a public forum if it was created by “purposeful government
action.” 119 Moreover, the court used a totality of the circumstances analysis 120
and the factors in Randall to find that Harshbarger’s conduct could bear a
sufficiently close nexus with the state to be fairly treated as that of the state
itself, and denied Harshbarger’s motion to dismiss. 121
It was at this juncture that the Knight v. Trump appeal was heard in
the Second Circuit. 122 The Second Circuit held “the First Amendment does
not permit a public official who [uses] a social media account for . . . official
113
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Windom v. Harshbarger, 396 F. Supp. 3d 675, 679 (N.D. W. Va. 2019).
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Using Rossignol v. Voorhaar, F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2003), the Court found that while

Harshbarger’s conduct did not meet all of the factors laid out in Randall, the question of
“what is fairly attributable [to the State] is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria
lack rigid simplicity.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S.
288, 295 (2001).
Harshbarger, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 684–85.
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
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purposes to exclude persons from an otherwise-open online dialogue
because they expressed views with which the official disagrees.” 123 The
defendant, President Trump, made three arguments: (1) the account at issue
is a vehicle for his own, personal speech; (2) the account is not a public
forum, and even if it were, blocking comments does not prevent access; and
(3) the posts are government speech to which the First Amendment does
not apply. 124
The Second Circuit asserted that even if government control over
the property is temporary, this does not determine whether the property is
a public forum. 125 “Temporary control by the government can still be control
for First Amendment purposes.” 126 The contention that the account is
private was rejected because: (1) the record reflects substantial pervasive
government involvement and control; (2) it is clothed in the trappings of the
President; and (3) the account is used to communicate and interact with the
public about matters related to official government business. 127 The court
reasoned that if the President is acting in an official capacity when he speaks
from the account, he is also acting in an official capacity when blocking those
who disagree with him. 128
Having established that the President is a government actor, the
court applied a public forum analysis. 129 The court found the President
opened “an instrumentality of communication ‘for indiscriminate use by the
general public’ creat[ing] a public forum,” which would preclude viewpoint
discrimination. 130 The court found that activities associated with Twitter are
expressive conduct and held that, while the plaintiffs cannot require the
President to listen, the government may not burden the plaintiffs’ ability to
converse not only with the President but with the thousands of other users
speaking to or about the President. 131 The President was not entitled to
censor viewpoints with which he disagreed, and the fact that the plaintiffs
could post messages elsewhere did not alleviate the burden created. 132
The court rejected the argument that the speech should be
evaluated under the government speech doctrine, which does not require
the government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when the government
speaks about its endeavors. 133 The court distinguished between the
123
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President’s tweets and that of user-generated content, deciding on a narrow
interpretation of the government speech doctrine to apply only to the
content of the President’s posts and identifying the interactive elements of
the account as part of a public forum. 134
In September, two months after the Knight v. Trump decision, the
California Southern District Court ruled on Garnier v. Poway Unified
School District. 135 The defendants (Board members) created social media
accounts to campaign for the school board. 136 After the election, they
repurposed these accounts to communicate school board activities to
constituents. 137 Both Board members maintained private accounts to
communicate with friends and family. 138 The plaintiffs were blocked from
accounts for posting what the Board members characterized as “repetitive
and unrelated” comments. 139 The plaintiffs claimed they were blocked as
retaliation for disagreeing with school board policies. 140
Board members argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing
because they were not injured in fact and alternative means of
communication with the board were available. 141 However, the court, relying
on Knight v. Trump, found an injury in fact because the plaintiff’s ability to
communicate using social media was limited, and their injuries were
“virtually certain” to continue because the plaintiffs remain blocked. 142 The
plaintiffs’ injuries were found to be concrete and particularized because, like
the Twitter users in Knight, they own the accounts that were blocked and
were each affected in a “personal and individual way.” 143 However, finding
no clear constitutional right to comment on government officials’ social
media posts, Board members were found to be entitled to qualified
immunity. 144
The court conducted a public forum analysis in this case and,
relying on the factors used in Knight, noted that Board members had not
adopted a comment policy to limit constituents’ interactions and had
created a designated public forum. 145 Board members argued that blocking
is a time, place, and manner restriction because the plaintiffs’ posts were
134
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repetitive and disrupted discussion. 146 The court denied summary judgment
of injunctive and declaratory relief because there was a dispute of material
fact: finding that if the posts were not actually disruptive, the reason for
blocking was pretextual and would therefore be a violation of plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights. 147

3.

2020: In the Shadow of the Supreme Court

As government official social media cases continue to percolate up
through the appellate level, they do so in the shadow of Knight v. Trump. 148
The timeline for this case is as follows: after the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s holding that
President Trump’s practice of blocking critics from his Twitter account
violates the First Amendment, a petition for rehearing en banc was denied
by a vote of 7–2; President Trump filed a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court on August 20, 2020; 149 and Knight submitted its
opposing brief on September 21, 2020. 150 While it is unclear whether
Trump v. Knight will be heard by the Supreme Court, what is clear is that
the circuits are relying heavily on a line found only in dicta in the
Packingham case, which compares social media to the public square, a
position that could be explicitly rejected once one of these cases is heard by
the United States Supreme Court.
Wagschal v. Skoufis 151 illustrates how quickly the position that social
media is subject to a public forum analysis has become cemented. In this
case, the defendant, a New York State Senator, blocked a private citizen
after the individual criticized the defendant’s policy positions. 152 The court
affirmed the test in Knight stating the court must determine: (1) whether the
plaintiffs’ interactions with the state actor’s social media account are
protected speech; (2) whether the social media account is a forum subject
to First Amendment protections; (3) which type of forum analysis applies;
and (4) whether the action was impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 153
The defendant conceded that, under Knight, his actions were
unconstitutional. 154 While the court never reached the case’s merit because
146
147

Id. at *11–12.
Id. at *12.
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the senator unblocked the plaintiff before trial, making the issue moot, the
court did emphasize that Knight “only protects ‘the blocked user’s right to
speak in a discrete, measurable way,’” and that “[a] public official may
choose to ‘selectively amplify the voices’ of certain users while hiding—or in
the case of Twitter, muting—the voices of others.” 155
Similarly, the Sheriff of Sacramento County deleted comments by
two leaders of Black Lives Matter Sacramento from the sheriff’s Facebook
page, and later banned one of the plaintiffs from the page. 156 In Lewis v.
Jones, the plaintiffs were granted preliminary injunctions, preventing the
defendant from banning the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs met the
Winter’s test: that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits; that the
plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; whether
the balance of equities and hardships is in the plaintiff’s favor; and whether
an injunction is in the public interest. 157
The court then relied on Knight and Davison to show that the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits because: (1) the defendant
acted under the color of law because the administration of the Facebook
page bore a sufficiently close nexus with the state because the defendant’s
account bore the trappings of an official state run account and the action
was related to events that arose out of the defendant’s official status; (2) the
defendant’s page is a public forum because the defendant intentionally
opened the public comment section for public discourse; (3) the defendant
engaged in viewpoint discrimination because it was undisputed that the
defendant banned plaintiffs after the plaintiffs commented on posts that they
disagreed with and the defendant offered no alternative explanation. 158 The
court rejected the argument that the defendant was engaged in government
speech and therefore entitled to curate that speech because, as discussed in
both Knight and Davison, the plaintiffs’ speech was not government
speech. 159
In Attwood v. Clemons, the defendant, a Representative in the
Florida House of Representatives, took a different approach. 160 After a
constituent posted a comment opposing Representative Clemons’s policy
on gun control, Representative Clemons blocked the constituent on both
Facebook and Twitter. 161 The plaintiff sued for declarative and injunctive
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Lewis v. Jones, 440 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2020).
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relief. 162 The defendant argued he was entitled to both Eleventh
Amendment immunity and absolute legislative immunity. 163 The court
found that “the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official
confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under
the color of state law,” and cited to the Second and Fourth Circuit decisions
that social media accounts are a public forum. 164 The court also found that
legislative immunity is confined to the activities that further an elected
official’s legislative duties but “Representative Clemons’s [use of] Twitter
and Facebook . . . [were] not ‘an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which [elected officials] participate in
committee and House proceedings.’” 165
Even in a 2021 decision finding that a government official did not
violate the First Amendment when blocking a constituent on Twitter, there
is still a consensus on the general framework. In Campbell v. Reisch, the
Eighth Circuit stated that a private account, in this case one devoted
primarily to campaign activities, “can turn into a governmental one if it
becomes an organ of official business.” 166 In this case, however, the court
found that Reisch did not meet the factors in Knight or Randall and that
“she did not intend her Twitter page ‘to be like a public park, where anyone
is welcome to enter and say whatever they want.’” 167 The court instead
likened the account to a campaign newsletter, and therefore, found that
there was no state action. 168 Without state action, there can be no violation
of the First Amendment.
IV.

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND LESSONS LEARNED TO DATE

In Packingham, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that the internet in
general, and social media in particular, have become the most important
spaces in modern society for public discourse. 169 More and more elected
officials are relying on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media accounts
to share information with constituents and receive important feedback in
return in a cost-effective, efficient, and—especially during public
emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic—safe and responsible
manner. It is important for these government leaders to recognize the ways
a personal (non-government sanctioned) social media page can quickly and
inadvertently transform into a First Amendment battleground. Whether a
162
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social media account will be viewed as an official as opposed to a private
account will depend on how a court views the totality of the circumstances.
Multiple factors will be considered, including whether the social media
account was operated for primarily a private or public purpose. To
determine the underlying purpose, questions will be asked such as:
• Is the government official’s title and public office contact
information on the page?
• Is it being used primarily as a tool of governance to
communicate about government activities?
• Does it rely on the help of government employees and public
resources to maintain the account?
• Does the government official use the account while carrying out
official responsibilities, such as tweeting about events the
official is attending in an official capacity?
The trend in First Amendment jurisprudence is to find social
media accounts that are used for official purposes to be some type of public
forum primarily because interactive features of social media enable
members of the public to speak by replying to tweets or posting comments.
Therefore, in general, when public comment is invited on a government
official’s social media site, comments should not be blocked, deleted, or
hidden based on the content or viewpoint expressed.
A public official does not surrender their own First Amendment
rights by entering public service. They can have private social media
accounts that stay private. To do so, the government official should not use
the account for any official purpose or in a way that appears an extension of
the public office in which they serve.
V.

CONCLUSION

Just a short time ago, in 2018, the court in Morgan v. Bevin
explicitly recognized that it was one of the first to “wrestle with the
intersections of the application of free speech to developing technology and
First Amendment rights of access to public officials using privately-owned
channels of communication.” 170 This reflection still rings true today, as a
trickle of First Amendment cases make their way through the circuit courts
and, eventually, to the United States Supreme Court. In the meantime, the
importance and urgency of developing clear legal principles related to social
media platforms escalates. There needs to be better guidance for elected
officials who have no choice but to embrace this new technology to
communicate and serve communities across the nation. As the Morgan
court eloquently stated:
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Since 1791, we have given voice to a national value in favor
of protecting robust political discourse in the words and
promise of the First Amendment to the Constitution. This
case requires the Court to test that value in an age in which
citizens have never had more platforms to speak. Voice is
no longer measured in only parchment or paper or access
to the airwaves but also in the exponential potential of the
internet. 171
While we wait to see when the United States Supreme Court will
take up the issue of social media in the context of a public forum analysis,
there seems to be an existing consensus among the circuit courts that if
accounts are being used by officials, in a manner that suggests they are the
official account of a government agent, the interactive portion of the account
is a public forum. It is not clear what category of forum it may be, but it is
not likely to matter because courts are analyzing blocking and deleting
comments as viewpoint discrimination, and the acts would therefore need
to pass strict scrutiny to be upheld as constitutional.
The alternative argument, that this is government speech and can
therefore promote a viewpoint, seems to have disappeared in the wake of
the Fourth and Second Circuits’ opinions in Randall and Knight v. Trump,
respectively. However, the nature and use of social media platforms are
unique and ever-evolving. If best used as means for communicating a
government official’s own visions, policies, and activities—the platform
created tools for public viewing and input aside—there may still be a case for
applying the government speech doctrine in some capacity.
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